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Abstract
In general, the more freedom we have, the better choices we can make,
and thus, the better possible economic outcomes. However, in practice,
people often artificially restrict their future options by making a commitment. At first glance, commitments make no economic sense, and so
their ubiquity seems puzzling. Our more detailed analysis shows that
commitment often makes perfect economic sense: namely, it is related to
the way we take future gains and losses into account. With the traditionally assumed exponential discounting, commitment indeed makes no
economic sense, but with the practically observed hyperbolic discounting,
commitment is indeed often economically beneficial.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Case study: a simpliﬁed description. This study started with a situation
which, at ﬁrst glance, sounds very reasonable. To get to the gist of it and to
avoid irrelevant details, we will describe a simpliﬁed version of this situation.
There are several Jewish congregations in El Paso. To coordinate their activities, these organizations form the Jewish Federation. To support its activities,
each congregation collects money from its congregants. A certain agreed-upon
portion of this money is given to the Federation.
The Federation’s Board – which consists of representatives of diﬀerent congregations – decides how to spend this money. Congregations submit proposals,
and the Board decides which proposals to grant and to what extent. In making
these decisions, the Board tries its best to make sure that the overall amount
of grants given to each congregation is proportional to the amount that the
congregation donated to the Federation’s budget.
1

From the economic viewpoint, this is a problem. At ﬁrst glance, this
sounds like a reasonable and fair procedure. However, if one thinks about it from
the economic viewpoint, this procedure does not seem to make much sense.
Each congregation pays a certain amount of the money to the Federation,
and then gets approximately the same amount of money back. So why not spend
it directly? Why do we need this complicated process in the ﬁrst place? Why
not reserve the Federation funding scheme only for emergencies or for unusual
situations?
Not only this scheme seems to make no economic sense, it seems to make
the situation worse for each congregation: when the original sum of money was
the congregation’s money, the congregation could spend it on whatever project
it could think about (and to which the congregants would agree). However, now
that the same amount of money has come through the Federation process, it
comes as Federation grants. The congregation is no longer free to spend this
money any way it wants: it can only spend it on the project that it originally
proposed to the Federation.
So, the congregation got its own money back, but it lost freedom in spending
this money: it cannot easily change its mind and spend this money on something
else, it has to stick to the original plan.
So why would the congregations go to all this process? Why not keep most
of the money to itself and spend it any way the congregation wants?
Commonsense explanation and other cases of commitment. A commonsense explanation is that the Federation scheme brings commitment. If a
congregation simply wants to sponsor some future event – e.g., a concert or a
conference, it can decide to allocate some funds for this event. But there is always a need of day-by-day funding: the building become shabby and may need
maintenance, the air conditioning equipment wears out and does not work as
well anymore, there is a desire to decorate the building, etc. When there is a
minor project like this worth doing, and there is a pool of money available for
some future event – it is tempting to take money from this future-event fund.
As a result, often, the future-event funding drastically decreases – and the event
never happens.
On the other hand, by signing to the Federation-based scheme, the congregation makes a commitment to spend the allocated money exclusively on the
future event – this avoiding the temptation of spending this amount to pay for
day-by-day operations.
Such a commitment procedures are ubiquitous. To avoid temptation, people make pledges to stick to their diets, to go to the gym, to save money for
retirement – often agreeing on penalties if they violate this commitment. For
example, a known advice for a politically involved person to stick to their diet or
ro their exercise routine is to sign a check to an opposite political organization
and give it to a trusted friend (or, better, a lawyer) with an instruction to send
it when the check-signer stops dieting or exercising.
Remaining problem. From the commonsense viewpoint, the above explanation may be somewhat convincing, but from the economic viewpoint, it still
2

remains a mystery.
There is a lot of evidence that freedom of choice is good for a person (see,
e.g., [6, 7] and references therein), so why would a person artiﬁcially restrict
his/her freedom of choice?
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we provide an economic explanation
for the beneﬁts of commitment.

2

Our Explanation

Main idea: let us take discounting into account. Our explanation is based
on the fact that when people make decisions, they take into account not only
the amount of money (or whatever good) that they get at the given moment
of time, they also take into account the future gains or losses – of course, with
some discounting, so that $1 in the future is valued less than $1 right now.
Formally, let m(t) denote the amount of money (or other goods) that a
person (or an organization) gets at moment t. If the person only took into
account the current gains – and ignored possible consequences – then a natural
idea would be to select an action for which the current gain m(t) is the largest
possible. Let D(t0 ) denote the discounting of an event t0 moments of time in
the future, i.e., the amount of money now which is equivalent to $1 at time t0
in the future. In these terms, the overall gain from a given action is determined
by the formula
m = m(t) + D(1) · m(t + 1) + D(2) · m(t + 2) + . . . ,

(1)

and we select an action for which this value m is the largest possible.
What discounting people use? If we place $1 in the bank, where it will grow
interest at a rate r%, then after t0 years, this amount will increase to a larger
r
def
amount q t0 , where q = 1 +
. To get $1 at moment t0 , we thus need to invest
100
1
the amount t0 = q −t0 . From this viewpoint, $1 at moment t0 is equivalent to
q
q −t0 dollars right now. It therefore seems reasonable to take D(t0 ) = q −t0 .
This exponential discounting was indeed the original idea of decision theorists
about how people make decisions. However, since the exponential function
decrease to practically 0 fast, it would mean that people, in eﬀect, ignore future
consequences when making decisions. Such behavior happens – e.g., when a
criminal robs a bank without thinking of future jail time or a young man takes
heavy drugs without thinking of long-term damage to his brain – but luckily,
such behavior is rare. Empirical data shows that when people make decisions,
they use the formula
1
(2)
D(t0 ) =
1 + k · t0
known as hyperbolic discounting; see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11].

3

Hyperbolic discounting explains economic eﬃciency of commitment.
Let us show that taking hyperbolic discounting into account explains the economics advantages of commitment.
For simplicity, let us start counting time from the moment when we make
the original decision, so that the original decision corresponds to moment t = 0.
At this moment, we plan an event at moment tE . We can gauge the positive
consequences of this event by estimating the amount mE that we were willing to
pay to have this event right now – if we had the corresponding amount available
right now.
Before this event, at some moment tT , there is a temptation (e.g., desire
to decorate the building). The negative aﬀect of ignoring this temptation can
also be gauged by the corresponding monetary amount; let us denote it by mT .
So, if we decide to keep the event and ignore the temptation, we thus get the
equivalent amount
m = −D(tT ) · mT + D(tE ) · mE .
(3)
If we do not sponsor the event, then we do not get any gain at moment tE but
we also do not suﬀer any negative consequences at the moment tT , so our overall
eﬀect is 0.
So, if the amount (3) is greater than 0, we decide to sponsor the event. For
hyperbolic discounting (2), the inequality m > 0 means that
1
1
+ mE ·
> 0,
1 + k · tT
1 + k · tE

(4)

mE · (1 + k · tT ) − mT · (1 + k · tE ) > 0.

(5)

−mT ·
i.e., equivalently, that

Formula (4) implies that mE > mT : otherwise, even with a larger discounting,
the gain mE would not outweigh the losses mT .
If at this moment t = 0l, we make a commitment, we will sponsor the desired
event. But suppose that we did not make this commitment. Then, in principle,
when the time tT of the temptation arrives, we can reconsider. At this time, we
still prefer to hold the event if
−mT + mE ·

1
> 0,
1 + k · (tE − tT )

i.e., if mE > mT · (1 + k · (tE − tT )). If mE < mT · (1 + k · (tE − tT )), we
will be tempted to reconsider – and for a large diﬀerence tE − tT , the product
mT · (1 + k · (tE − tT )) is also large, so this inequality is quite possible. Thus, if
we do not make a commitment, it is highly possible that we will reconsider and
the desired event will not happen.
Thus, commitment indeed makes perfect economic sense.
Comment. Interestingly, the above argument only holds for the hyperbolic
discounting. For exponential discounting, if the initial inequality
−q −tT · mT + q −tE · mE > 0
4

(6)

is satisﬁed, then at every future moment t, multiplying both sides of inequality
(6) by q t , we get the new inequality
−q −(tT −t) · mT + q −(tE −t) · mE > 0
meaning that we should still be committed to holding the event.
Thus, the economics of commitment is based on the fact that our discounting is hyperbolic: for exponential discounting, there is no economic need for
commitment.
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